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Who Should Determine Whether an Agency’s Explanation of a Tax Rule Is
Adequate?
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 1
I agree with Professor Hickman with respect to several basic propositions: (1) IRS
and Treasury have been systematically declining to act in accordance with the duties
imposed on those agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for many
decades; (2) courts should require IRS and Treasury to comply with the APA; and, (3) the
Supreme Court has signaled its intent to “take administrative law to tax” as suggested by
the title of this symposium, by requiring IRS and Treasury to comply with the APA. 2 I
also agree with Professor Johnson that the duty to explain why it has issued a rule is one
of the most important duties that the APA imposes on IRS and Treasury. 3
I part company with most of the participants in this symposium, however, with
respect to the important question of what institution should have the power to decide
whether an agency’s explanation for a tax rule is adequate and whether an agency’s
notice of proposed rulemaking involving taxation is adequate. Professors Hickman and
Johnson would give that responsibility to courts, as has long been the case for rules
issued by other agencies. I think that such an allocation of institutional responsibility
would have disastrous effects.
Professor Hickman argues persuasively that IRS and Treasury issue an average of
32 tax rules per year that the agencies should, but do not, subject to the notice and
comment procedure described in APA section 553. 4 I agree that IRS should use the
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notice and comment procedure to issue those rules, but that procedure consumes a lot of
time and agency resources. Thus, for instance, Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and
Lisa Peters found that EPA required an average of 5.5 years to issue each of 90 rules to
implement the Air Toxic Emission Standards. 5 Most of the rules Wagner et al. studied
were not economically significant rules, i.e., a rule that is expected to have an annual
effect on the economy of at least $100,000,000. 6 Many other studies have found that
issuance of a rule through use of the notice and comment process takes much longer and
requires a much greater commitment of agency resources if the rule is economically
significant. Thus, for instance, NHTSA’s passive restraint rule required almost twenty
years to issue and consumed such a high proportion of NHTSA’s resources that the
agency largely abandoned rulemaking as a means of implementing its highway safety
mission, 7 and EPA has still not been able to issue an interstate pollution transport rule
that can satisfy the courts after over two decades of devoting significant resources to that
rulemaking. 8
The time and resource consuming effects of the notice and comment procedure
are often described under the heading of rulemaking ossification. 9 Ossification has many
adverse effects, including (1) delay in issuing important rules; (2) failure to issue
important rules; (3) diversion of scarce agency resources from other important tasks; (4)
substitution of inferior methods of implementing a statutory mission; and, (5) failure to
5
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amend or to rescind rules for many years after they have become obsolete. 10 If IRS and
Treasury are required to use the notice and comment process to issue 32 more tax rules
each year, they will experience all of the adverse effects of ossification unless Congress
increases significantly the budget and personnel at the two agencies. That seems highly
unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future given budgetary and political constraints.
Some of the adverse effects of requiring IRS and Treasury to comply with the
APA are unavoidable and some of those adverse effects may be worth tolerating in order
to obtain the advantages of the notice and comment procedure. We could take one step
that would reduce the costs of compliance with the APA significantly, however, and
create a situation in which the benefits of the notice and comment procedure are not
overwhelmed by the costs of the procedure. That step is to eliminate judicial review of
the notice and comment process. In the tax context, that step can be accomplished easily
in a manner that is consistent with existing statutes and precedents.

Courts Have Redefined the Rulemaking Process

It is easy to trace the path that has led to ossification of the notice and comment
rulemaking process. APA section 553 requires an agency to use a 3-step process when it
issues a rule. 11 It must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking, solicit comments from the
public in response to the notice, and issue a final rule that incorporates a concise general
statement of the basis and purpose of the rule. The APA describes the three steps in the
following language:
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(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register . . . The
notice shall include-(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved. . . .
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented,
the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose.

Until 1967, agencies complied with APA section 553 as that provision was
written. In a typical rulemaking, the agency issued a relatively brief notice that complied
with 553(b), received and considered comments that were modest in length, and then
issued a final rule that incorporated a “concise general statement of basis and purpose”
that was only a few pages long. 12 The agency practice of compliance with APA section
553 as it was written ended as a result of a series of court opinions that were issued
between 1967 and 1973. Those opinions changed the meaning of section 553 in ways that
render it unrecognizable when compared with the language of section 553.
The Supreme Court’s 1967 opinion in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner 13 opened
the door to a series of lower court opinions that “interpreted” section 553 to mean
something dramatically different from the simple efficient decision making process
described in the APA. In Abbott, the Court announced a new test for determining whether
a rule is ripe for pre-enforcement review. The Court announced and applied for the first
12
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time a presumption of reviewability so strong that it trumped the language of statutes. 14
Like most regulatory statutes, the statute at issue in Abbott explicitly provided a means
through which a party could seek review of a rule—by challenging its validity in an
enforcement proceeding initiated by the agency against the party. The statute did not
authorize a court to engage in pre-enforcement of a rule. The Court applied the new
presumption of reviewability to reverse the normal process for determining whether
Congress has authorized a court to act. Instead of asking whether Congress authorized
pre-enforcement review, the Court asked whether there was “clear and convincing
evidence” that Congress intended to preclude pre-enforcement review. 15 The Court
concluded that the presence of a statutory provision that authorized review of a rule in an
enforcement proceeding and the absence of a statutory provision that authorized preenforcement review of a rule were not enough to satisfy the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard that the Court announced to accompany its newly announced
presumption in favor of pre-enforcement review of rules.
Before Abbott, most rules were subject to review only in an enforcement
proceeding. After Abbott, a rule was subject to pre-enforcement review if, like most rules,
it presents a legal issue that is “fit for judicial resolution” and “requires an immediate
change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to
noncompliance . . . .” 16
The stark differences between the review of a rule in an enforcement proceeding
Congress authorized and the pre-enforcement review of a rule that the Court authorized
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became apparent within a few years after the Court issued its opinion in Abbott. When a
rule was reviewed in the context of an enforcement proceeding, it was usually reviewed
by a district court that used the record of the enforcement proceeding as the basis for
review. Since agencies usually exercise their prosecutorial discretion to bring an action to
enforce a rule only when the target of the enforcement action has engaged in conduct that
is particularly egregious and obviously harmful, the record in the enforcement proceeding
typically included evidence that illustrated the need for the rule in a specific context in
which violation of the rule caused serious damage. As a result, an agency was likely to
prevail in an action in which the target of an enforcement action sought review of the
rule. Rules were rarely challenged because a regulated firm knew that it was unlikely to
prevail when it attempted to challenge the validity of the rule in an enforcement
proceeding. The firm also knew that it was vulnerable to serious direct and indirect
adverse consequences if it violated the rule, challenged the validity of the rule in an
enforcement proceeding, and lost.
By contrast, any firm that dislikes a rule has an incentive to seek pre-enforcement
review of the rule knowing that it will suffer no adverse effects if it loses. Within a few
years, it became apparent that a regulated firm also has a much better chance of
prevailing in a proceeding in which it seeks pre-enforcement review of a rule than when
it challenges the validity of the same rule in a proceeding to enforce the rule. In most
cases, pre-enforcement review takes place in a circuit court rather than a district court.
The circuit court has an understandable desire to have access to some kind of record that
it can use as the basis for review. It does not have access to the record of an enforcement
proceeding for that purpose, so it uses a “record” that consists of the notice, the

6

comments filed in response to the notice, and the “concise general statement” of the
rule’s basis and purpose that the agency is required to incorporate in the final rule.
In Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd 17, one of the first preenforcement review cases decided after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Abbott,
the D.C. Circuit stated that it needed access to a record sufficient to allow it to engage in
pre-enforcement review of a rule. The court then described the conflict between the
record that is created when an agency complies with APA section 553 and the kind of
record the court thought that it needed to engage in pre-enforcement review of a rule. The
court resolved that conflict by instructing agencies to take the actions needed to develop
the kind of record the court considered necessary to allow it to engage in review rather
than to comply with the requirements Congress described in APA section 553. In the
court’s words:
[It] is appropriate for us to remind the Administrator of the ever present possibility of judicial
review, and to caution against an overly literal reading of the statutory terms ‘concise’ and
‘general.’ These adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of judicial scrutiny, which do
not contemplate that the court itself will, by a laborious examination of the record, formulate in
the first instance the significant issues faced by the agency and articulate the rationale of their
resolution. We do not expect the agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion included in the
submissions made to it in informal rule making. We do expect that, if the judicial review which
Congress has thought it important to provide is to be meaningful, the ‘concise general statement
of * * * basis and purpose’ mandated by Section 4 will enable us to see what major issues of
policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it
did. 18

The court went on to hold that the three-page “concise general statement of basis and
purpose” that the agency had incorporated in the rule was sufficient to allow the court to

17
18

407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id. at 338.

7

uphold the rule because the petitioner did not file detailed and well-supported comments
that criticized the rule proposed in the notice. 19
The members of the D.C. Bar immediately internalized and acted on the message
the D.C. Circuit sent in Auto Parts. Lawyers for regulated firms that disliked a rule
proposed by an agency began to submit lengthy and detailed comments that criticized the
rule, often accompanied by consultants’ reports that purported to make findings that
undermined the basis for the rule. Thus, for instance, when the National Highway Safety
Administration proposed another rule shortly after its “victory” in Auto Parts, a trade
association that disliked the proposed rule submitted lengthy comments that criticized in
detail every aspect of the agency proposal. 20 The comments were accompanied by the
reports of studies conducted by consulting firms retained by the association that
purported to find that the proposed rule was unnecessary and that its implementation
would be costly and dangerous. The association prevailed in the pre-enforcement review
proceeding it initiated based on the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the final rule was
arbitrary and capricious because the agency had not responded adequately to the
comments filed by the association that were critical of the proposed rule. 21
That pair of D.C. Circuit opinions created an entirely new legal environment.
Every circuit has followed the lead of the D.C. Circuit in holding that an agency rule is
arbitrary and capricious unless the agency responds adequately to all well-supported
comments that are critical of the rule proposed by the agency, and the Supreme Court’s
1983 opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

19
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Insurance Co. 22 has been widely interpreted to approve of the D.C. Circuit approach. The
Supreme Court also added a seemingly open-ended duty to consider alternatives to any
action an agency proposes to take in a rulemaking. Not surprisingly, those judicial
opinions have created incentives for parties that dislike proposed rules to bury an agency
with comments that criticize the proposed rule and suggest alternatives to the proposed
rule. Comments on economically significantly proposed rules routinely are tens of
thousands of pages long and are regularly accompanied by consultant studies that purport
to undermine the bases for the proposed rule. Agencies regularly require years to draft the
several-hundred page “concise general statement of basis and purpose” that must be
incorporated in a rule, and courts reject 30 per cent of the rules as arbitrary and capricious
because the agency did not adequately respond to one or more of the voluminous critical
comments. 23 In short, the courts converted the statutory requirement for a “concise
general statement of basis and purpose” into a judicial requirement for a detailed and
encyclopedic document that invariably spans hundreds of pages.
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Abbott, circuit courts began
a similar process of rewriting the APA notice requirement. APA section 553 requires an
agency to issue a “general notice” that consists of:
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved. . . . 24

As was true of the requirement for a “concise general statement of basis and purpose,”
before the Court decided Abbott, agencies complied with the modest notice requirement
22
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in APA section 553 by publishing notices that were just a few pages long but that
complied fully with the language of the APA. That changed as courts redefined the
requirements of the APA.
The post-Abbott judicial opinion that began the process of redefinition of the
notice requirement Congress created in the APA was issued by the Third Circuit in
1972. 25 The court held a notice inadequate because it did not inform the public of all of
the possible ways in which the agency might change the rules it proposed to amend. All
circuits soon adopted that demanding method of determining the adequacy of a notice.
All circuits now hold that a notice is inadequate if the final rule is not a “logical
outgrowth” of the notice. 26 The practical effect of the “logical outgrowth” test is to
require agencies to attempt to identify and describe in a notice every conceivable version
of the final rule the agency might adopt years later. 27
The D.C. Circuit joined in the process of redefining the notice requirement a year
later. In 1973, the D.C. Circuit rejected an agency rule because the rule was based in part
on a source of data that the agency had not identified in its notice. 28 All circuits quickly
embraced that dramatic judicial expansion of the “general notice” requirement that
Congress imposed in the APA. 29 All circuits now hold that “an agency commits serious
procedural error when it fails to reveal portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule
in time to allow for meaningful commentary” 30 and that the notice “must provide
sufficient information to permit adversarial critique.” 31 The practical effect of this
25
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judicially-imposed duty is to require an agency to anticipate at the time it issues a notice
all of the sources of data and analysis that it may want to rely on years later when it
issues a final rule. The agency also must issue a supplemental notice and provide a new
opportunity to comment if it decides to rely on a source of data or analysis that did not
become available until after it issued its initial notice. 32 That is a routine occurrence,
since a major rulemaking typically requires years to complete.
Professors Wagner, Barnes, and Peters have accurately described the results of the
dramatic judicial expansions of the modest requirement to issue a “general notice” that
Congress imposed in APA section 553. The pre-notice part of the rulemaking process
now takes more than twice as long as the post-notice part of the process because “the
courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must be
essentially in final form at the proposed rule stage.” 33 When the judicial expansions of
the congressional requirement of a “concise general statement of basis and purpose” are
added to the judicial expansions of the congressional requirement of a “general notice” of
proposed rulemaking, the judicial version of APA section 553 bears no relationship to the
requirements imposed by the statute. Application of the judicial version of the
requirements of the APA to 32 more tax rules per year issued by agencies that already
confront enormous resource constraints in their efforts to implement the constantly
expanding agenda Congress assigns them and that already take too long to issue
important rules would have devastating effects.
OIRA Is Better than Courts at Reviewing Rules

32
33
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The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reviews all
economically significant rules before they go into effect. 34 Many scholars have described
the ways in which OIRA insures that agencies do not overstep the boundaries of their
authority and harm the economy by engaging in regulation that imposes costs that exceed
their benefits, 35 but OIRA also performs its review function in ways that improve the
quality of the rulemaking process in other ways.
As Justice (then-professor) Breyer explained twenty years ago, OIRA has major
advantages over courts in performing tasks of this type. In his 1993 book, Breaking the
Vicious Circle, Justice Breyer described in detail why OIRA is much better suited to
review of agency rules than are courts. 36 OIRA can apply its multi-disciplinary expertise
and the virtues of bureaucracy to rationalize the agency policy making process. 37
Justice Breyer also contrasted OIRA with courts by illustrating some of the many
ways in which judicial precedents can have unintended adverse effects. Thus, for
instance, a holding like the Supreme Court’s 1983 holding in State Farm that rejected a
rule because an agency did not adequately consider an alternative to the rule is likely to
be interpreted and applied to require agencies to waste time and resources by engaging in
the futile task of attempting “to establish procedures to consider thoroughly all
alternatives in every case.” 38
More recently, former OIRA officials like Sally Katzen, Cass Sunstein, and
Jennifer Nou have described in detail the many ways in which OIRA insures that agency
34
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rules are rational and based on multi-disciplinary expertise. Former OIRA Administrator
Katzen has described some of her many successful efforts to use the OIRA power to
review rules as a point of entry to allow OIRA to work with agencies to improve the rules
they issue. 39 Former Administrator Sunstein has explained that “OIRA helps to collect
widely dispersed information—information that is held throughout the executive branch
and by the public as a whole.” 40 Sunstein’s assistant at OIRA, Professor Nou, has used
her detailed description of the many ways in which OIRA improves the rulemaking
process as part of the basis for her well-supported argument that agencies should pay
more attention to the potential for OIRA review than to the potential for judicial review
when they conduct rulemakings. 41
As Breyer, Katzen, Sunstein, and Nou have explained in detail, the contrast
between OIRA review of rules and court review of rules is stark. OIRA applies a
multidisciplinary approach that draws on numerous sources of expertise to engage in an
intense and continuous process of communication with an agency that is designed to
identify flaws in an agency rule and to assist the agency in identifying and implementing
beneficial changes to the rule before it is published. In most cases, that review process is
completed within ninety days. 42 By contrast, a reviewing court has no access to relevant
expertise beyond its law clerks; it engages in a review process that requires over a year to
complete; and, it has extremely limited means of communicating with an agency. If the
reviewing court identifies a flaw in an agency rule, it remands the rule. In many cases, the

39
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agency must then begin a new rulemaking process that takes many more years to
complete. 43 Moreover, as Justice Breyer has explained, the opinion in which the court
rejects the agency rule is often misunderstood by other courts and/or by agencies. Thus,
for instance, the Supreme Court’s famous 1983 opinion in which it rejected an agency
decision in a rulemaking because the agency did not adequately consider an alternative to
the action it took 44 has been widely interpreted to require every agency to engage in
exhaustive discussion of every alternative to every action it considers in every
rulemaking, thereby adding to the high cost and delay of the rulemaking process. 45
OIRA review is also far more likely than judicial review to further the values of
democracy. In its landmark opinion in Chevron v. NRDC, 46 the Court held that reviewing
courts must uphold any reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous language in an
agency administered statute. The Court explained why courts must defer to agencies in
the policy making process:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government
. . . . In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views
of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 47

That reasoning also supports substitution of OIRA review of rules for judicial review of
rules. The Administrator of OIRA invariably is someone who communicates regularly

43
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with the President. OIRA review reflects “the incumbent administration’s views of wise
policy to inform its decisions.” Former Administrator Katzen has described the
relationship between OIRA review and the President with a colorful metaphor. 48 She
notes that the office of the OIRA Administrator is only a stone’s throw from the office of
the President. She says she can prove that by showing anyone who is interested the bruise
on her head from the time when she misunderstood the preferences of her boss, President
Clinton.
Most federal agencies are mission-oriented. Thus, for instance, EPA is staffed by
people who are dedicated to improving air and water quality. That is an institutional
characteristic that has many good effects, but it can also have adverse effects. Agencies
tend to make decisions with tunnel vision. There are many examples of circumstances in
which Presidential involvement in a rulemaking process at EPA has yielded a rule that
incorporates important considerations beyond those a special purpose agency is likely to
consider. The example I regularly use to make this point to my students is the decision of
EPA during the Carter Administration to set the emissions limit applicable to sulfur
dioxide at a level that disappointed many of the environmental advocacy groups that are
EPA’s most reliable supporters. 49 EPA’s decision was influenced by meetings between
the EPA Administrator and the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, the Secretary
of Energy, the majority leader of the Senate, and the President. 50 Those meetings insured
that the EPA decision incorporated consideration of factors like the effects of the
potential alternative decisions on national security, international relations, inflation,

48
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employment, and economic growth. D.C. Circuit Judge Wald wisely rejected claims that
the meetings were inappropriate and unlawful. She concluded instead that meetings
between agency decision makers and their political superiors are essential to the
democratic legitimacy of the agency rulemaking process. 51
Courts Can and Should Refuse to Review the Adequacy of Agency
Explanations for Tax Rules
My arguments to substitute OIRA review for judicial review of rules apply to all
rules issued by all agencies. I recognize, however, that I am unlikely to be successful in
persuading courts to stop engaging in pre-enforcement review of most rules issued by
most agencies. That would require the Supreme Court to issue opinions that reduce the
strength of the presumption in favor of pre-enforcement review and/or overturn the many
precedents in which courts have dramatically expanded the requirements of APA section
553. 52 I hope the Supreme Court takes those actions, but it is unlikely to do so in the near
future.
Fortunately, it is easy for the courts to create the kind of legal environment I
prefer in the tax context. Courts need merely to apply existing precedents. Tax rules have
always differed from all other rules because of two statutes. The Anti-Injunction Act
provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed.” 53 The purpose of the Act is “to permit the
United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention,
and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums to be determined in a suit for
51

Id. at 405-408.
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52

16

refund.” 54 The second statute that is relevant to this issue is the Declaratory Judgment
Act. That Act authorizes courts to issue declaratory judgments, but it exempts from its
scope suits “with respect to Federal taxes.” 55 Courts interpret the Anti-Injunction Act and
the exemption in the Declaratory Judgment Act to have the same purpose and scope. 56
The Court attached great significance to the Declaratory Judgment Act when it
created and applied its presumption in favor of pre-enforcement review of rules in Abbott.
The Court justified its new presumption with the assertion that the promulgation of a rule
that requires petitioners to change their behavior “puts petitioners in a dilemma that it
was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate.” 57 The Court
referred to the Declaratory Judgment Act again when it announced the holding of the
case:
Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a regulation requires an
immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs' conduct of their affairs with serious penalties
attached to noncompliance, access to the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or some other unusual
circumstance, neither of which appears here. 58

Consistent with the language and reasoning in Abbott, courts have long held that
rules “with respect to Federal taxes” are not subject to the pre-enforcement review
authorized in Abbott because the Anti-Injunction Act and the tax exemption in the
Declaratory Judgment Act qualify as “statutory bars” to such suits. The en banc D.C.
Circuit reaffirmed that interpretation of the two Acts in a 2011 opinion in which it held
that an IRS rule was subject to pre-enforcement review because it was not a rule with

54

Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1,7 (1962).
28 U.S.C. §2201(a).
56
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. en banc 2011).
57
387 U.S. at 152.
58
Id. at 153.
55

17

respect to federal taxes. 59 The court emphasized the narrowness of its holding and the
breadth of the prohibition on pre-enforcement review of tax rules: “in the tax context, the
only APA suits subject to review would be those cases pertaining to final agency action
unrelated to tax assessment and collection.” 60 [emphasis added].
Similarly, the Supreme Court recognized that the Anti-Injunction Act bars preenforcement review of rules that relate to “assessment or collection of any tax” in its
2012 opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 61 The Court
held that a court could engage in pre-enforcement review of the individual mandate in the
Affordable Care Act because Congress had explicitly characterized the only sanction
available to enforce the mandate as a “penalty” rather than a tax. 62
Conclusion
My goal is simple. I want to keep courts out of the process of determining
whether an IRS or Treasury Department explanation of a tax rule is sufficient to comply
with the APA requirement of a “concise general statement of basis and purpose” for a tax
rule and the process of determining whether an IRS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is
adequate. Fortunately, all the courts need to do to further my goal is to adhere to a long
line of precedents that are based on the plain language of two statutes.
I agree with the other participants in this symposium that the courts should “take
administrative law to tax” by holding that IRS and Treasury must comply with the notice
and comment requirements of APA when they issue tax rules. I differ with the other
participants by disagreeing with the view that the courts should apply to such rules the
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judicial interpretations of “notice” and “concise general statement of basis and purpose”
that have had the effect of introducing massive time and resource consuming
inefficiencies into the rulemaking process in contexts other than tax. We simply cannot
afford to allow courts to delay interminably the process of issuing tax rules, thereby to so
“interrupt the flow of revenues as to jeopardize the Nation’s fiscal stability” in violation
of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. 63
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Alexander v. Americans United, 416 U.S. 752,769 (1974).

19

